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Abstract
Do …rms reduce employment when their insiders (established, in-
cumbent employees) claim higher wages? The conventional answer in
the theoretical literatureis that insiderpower has no in‡uenceon em-
ployment, provided that the newly hired employees (entrants) receive
their reservation wages. Thereason given isthat an increasein insider
wages gives rise to a countervailing fall in reservation wages, leaving
the present value of wage costs unchanged. Our analysis contradicts
this conventional answer. We show that, in the context ofa stochastic
model of the labor market, an increase in insider wages promotes …r-
ing in recessions, while leaving hiring in booms unchanged. Thereby
insider power reduces average employment.
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11 Introduction
There is a long-standing debate about whether insider wages a¤ect employ-
ment. When the insiders - established, incumbent employees whose positions
are protected by labor turnover costs - use their market power to push up
their wages, do they thereby induce …rms to reduce employment?
Although non-economists generally think that the answer must be an un-
equivocal “yes,” the theoretical literature on this important issue is divided,
and the mainstream answer is “no.” The rationale for the mainstream posi-
tion is well-known, running along the following lines. Not all employees have
protected jobs and market power. In particular, before employees become
insiders, they are commonly “entrants,” whose positions are usually not as-
sociated with signi…cant turnover costs and who have no substantial market
power. Then, it is argued, the entrant gets paid his reservation wage, i.e. the
wage at which the present value of expected utility from employment over
the entrant’s working lifetime is equal to the corresponding present value
from unemployment. The higher the insider wage that the entrants expect
to receive in the future, the lower is their reservation wage. Consequently,
when insiders push up their wages, they redistribute labor income over their
job tenure, away from their junior (entrant) period and towards their senior
(insider) period. But the present value of wage payments over the workers’
tenure at their …rms is una¤ected, since it remains equal to the present value
from unemployment. For this reason, it is alleged, insider power does not
discourage employment.
The opposing view is that entrants may not in practice receive their reser-
vation wage. There are many reasons why this might be so.1 Since insider
wages are often substantially higher than the minimum amount necessary to
keep them from quitting and since these wages are oftenpaid over substantial
periods of time, an entrants’ reservation wage must be very low, generally
a large negative number. But, …rst, credit constraints, minimum wage laws,
andsocial conventions may all prevent entrants from paying substantial sums
to purchase their jobs. Second, entrants may often have some market power,
since …rms commonly expend advertising and screening costs before the en-
trant wage is negotiated; alternatively, entrants may gain market power by
joining a union. Third, insiders may use their market power to keep the en-
trant wage high and thereby discourage the …rm from hiring many entrants
and thereby reducing the marginal product of labor and putting downward
pressure on the insider wage. Fourth, entrants may receive more than their
reservation wage for e¢ciency wage reasons, namely, to stimulate e¤ort or to
1These reasons are surveyed in Lindbeck and Snower (2001).
2attract high-quality job applicants. And …nally, …rms may voluntarily o¤er
entrants more than their reservation wage, for otherwise the entrants may
become more pro…table than the insiders. In that event, the …rms would
then have an incentive to churn (i.e. replace all their insiders by entrants),
thereby eliminating the entrants’ prospect of becoming insiders and thereby
driving up the entrant reservation wage.2 In short, if a rise in the insider
wage does not lead to an equal fall in the entrant wage (in present value
terms), then insider power will indeed reduce employment, since it leads to
a rise in the present value of …rm’s wage payments.
This controversy is of far-reaching importance, central to all branches of
labor theory in which workers have some market power. If the mainstream
view is correct, then factors that enhance insiders’ bargaining power - such
as union density, the rights to strike and work-to-rule, and union militancy
- have no employment repercussions. Moreover, the employment e¤ect of
job security legislation and a host labor turnover costs will be independent
of its in‡uence on wage formation. If, on the other hand, the opposing
view is correct, there is a much stronger case to be wary of insider power,
for anything that strengthens the insiders’ hand in wage determination will
thereby adversely a¤ect employment.
There is a large literature in support of the mainstream position.3 What
has made it appear persuasive is the widespread view that, in practice, en-
trant wages are a reasonable approximation of the reservation wage, and
that the above rationales for discrepancies between these wages are the ex-
ception that proves the rule. After all, it is argued, …rms usually have a much
stronger in‡uence over wages than their newrecruits (particularly when they
are junior and inexperienced) and thus there is little to stop these …rms from
driving entrant wages down as far as they will go, namely, to the reservation
wage.
This paper calls this mainstream position into question. We argue that
even if entrants receive their reservation wage, insider power still has a
contractionary in‡uence on employment. The underlying intuition may be
summarized succinctly as follows.
The e¤ect of insider power on employment works through two decisions
by …rms: the hiring decision (in economic upturns) and the …ring decision
(in downturns). The mainstream view is correct with regard to the hiring
decision: Ariseintheinsider wage reduces theentrants’ (reservation) wage by
an equal amount (in present value terms), and thus the fall in employment
2For a formal model of this incentive problem, see Manzini and Snower (1996).
3See, for example, Bertola (1990), Booth (1996), Burda (1992), Fehr (1989), Fehr and
Kirchsteiger (1994), Frank (1985), Frank and Malcomson (1994), Gottfries and Sjostrom
(2000), Lazear (1990) and Vetter and Andersen (1994).
3from the insider-wage increase is exactly o¤set by the rise in employment
from the entrant-wage decrease.
But the …ring decision is a¤ected. Here insider (recession-time) employ-
ment is reducednot only by theinsider-wage increase, but alsobythe entrant-
wage decrease. When entrants become more pro…table relative to insiders,
…rms …remore insiders in arecession. Afterall, itis nowcheaper tolay o¤ the
high-wage insiders when demand is low, and replace them by the low-wage
entrants when demand is high.
Since hiring is unchanged but …ring rises, it follows that in the long run -
over upturns and downturns - insider power reduces employment. And this
is so even if there are no wage ‡oors that prevent the entrants’ wage from
falling to the reservation wage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model. In
this context, Section 3 examines the in‡uence of insider power on the hiring
decision. Section 4 investigates this in‡uence on the …ring decision. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
To make our point as simply and transparently as possible, consider a labor
market4 with a …xed number of identical …rms that can be in two states, a
“boom” (represented by the superscript “+”) and a “recession” (represented
by the superscript “¡”).5 The two states are generated by ‡uctuations in
productivity taking the form of a two-state Markov process, in which P is
the probability of remaining in the same state and (1¡P) is the probability
of switching to the other state. These ‡uctuations are assumed to be of
su¢cient magnitude to lead to changes in employment. In particular, in an
upturn (i.e. the economy moves from a recession to a boom), …rms hire
entrants, and in a downturn (i.e. the economy moves from a boom into
a recession), …rms …re some insiders. When conditions are unchanged, they
retain their existing insiders. (Although our Markov model provides a simple
4For simplicity, we do not consider feedback e¤ects via other markets for two reasons.
First, this makes our analysis comparable with the relevant literature, which is also based
on partial equilibrium models of the labor market. Second, such feedback e¤ects do not
generate conceptually interesting insights. (For example, when an insider wage hike re-
duces employment, it a¤ects insider income and pro…t income, which in turn in‡uence
product demand, and this might a¤ect labor demand. Such a feedback e¤ect could be
incorporated into the magnitude of our assumed shocks, described below.)
5Alternatively, we could restrict ourselves to the microeconomic analysis of a single
…rm, and then our “booms” and “recessions” may be interpreted simply as …rm-speci…c
productivity or revenue shocks.
4analytical setting for examining how insider wages a¤ect employment, it is
important to note that our qualitative results do not depend on the Markov
structure. In Appendix A, for example, we show how our results emerge
when the distribution of productivity swings does not depend on the current
state of the world.)
Since the focus of our analysis is about how employment decisions re-
spond to insider wages, it is natural to assume that wages are predetermined
when the employment decisions are made and it is not necessary to specify
precisely how insider wages are set. Although the qualitative conclusions of
our analysis could easily be generated through a model in which the insider
wage is the outcome of a bargaining process, in this paper it su¢ces, for
simplicity, to take the insider wage as exogenously given: W+ in a boom
and W¡ in a recession.6 (We adopt the simple convention that upper-case
variables refer to insiders and lower-case variables refer to entrants.)
Entrants are assumed to have no bargaining power when they enter the
…rm; thus the entrant wage is equal to the reservation wage. An unemployed
workerreceives anunemploymentbene…tofb(a positive constant) per period.
For simplicity, but without any substantial loss of generality, we assume that
workers’ utility is measured by their income.
The entrant wage is relevant to employment only in upturns, when the
economy moves from recession to boom and the …rm thus hire entrants. The
entrant (reservation) wage in a boom is determined simply as follows. Let
r+
t be the entrant’s reservation wage in a boom, Yt be the present value of an
unemployed person’s income, and ± be the discount factor. Then the present
value of an entrant’s expected income is7
yt = rt + ±P Y +
t+1 +±(1¡ P) Y¡
t+1 (1)
(In the current boom, the entrant receives the reservation wage rt; in the
following period, the entrant has a probability P of remaining in a boom
and receiving the present value of an insider’s income Y
+
t+1, and a probability
1 ¡ P of encountering a recession and becoming jobless8 with the present
6In other words, it is su¢cient to assume that wages are exogenous in order to analyze
the e¤ect of insider wages on employment. If, however, we ask how cyclical swings a¤ect
employment, then our analysis needs to be combined with a model of wage determination.
7Since hiring takes place only in a boom, our analysis is concerned with the entrant’s
income only in a boom. Thus, for simplicity, we suppress the superscript “+” from the
present value of the entrant’s expected income, taking it for granted that yt = y+
t . For the
same reason, we also suppress the superscript “+” from the reservation wage, accepting
that r+
t = rt.
8Note that, in our stationary two-stage Markov process, all entrants are …red when
the …rm moves from a boom into a recession. (If this were not the case, so that some
5value of an unemployed worker’s expected income Y
¡
t+1.) Moreover, since the
entrant receives the reservation wage, the expected incomes of an entrant
and an unemployed person are equal:
yt = Y
+
t (2)
The present value of an insider’s expected income in a boom is
Y +
t = W+
t +±PY +
t+1 + ±(1 ¡P)Y¡
t+1 (3)
(The insider receives the insider wage W+ in time period t, and in period
t+1 receives the present value Y
+
t+1 of the insider’s expected income if there
is a boom or the present value Y¡
t+1 of the unemployed worker’s income if
there is a recession.9)
The present value of an unemployed person’s expected income in a boom
is
Y
+
t = b+ ±P(1¡ ut+1)yt+1+ ±Put+1Y
+
t+1 + ±(1 ¡ P)Y
¡
t+1 (4)
where ut+1 is the unemployment rate.10 (The unemployed person obtains the
unemployment bene…t b in the current period t. With probability P there is
a boom in the following period, and then the person has a chance 1 ¡ ut+1
of becoming an entrant with income y, or a chance ut+1 of remaining jobless
with income Y
+
t+1. With probability 1 ¡ P a recession occurs, and then the
person remains unemployed, receiving the present value of an unemployed
worker’s income Y¡
t+1.)
In the stationary state corresponding to our Markov process, yt = yt+j =
y; Y
+
t = Y
+
t+j = Y +; Y
+
t = Y
+
t+j = Y+; Y
¡
t = Y
¡
t+j = Y¡and W
+
t = W
+
t+j =
W+ for all integers j. Onthis account, andrecalling equation(2), the present
value of the unemployed worker’s expected income in a boom simpli…es to
Y
+ = b +±PY
+ + ±(1 ¡ P) Y
¡
Likewise, the present value of an unemployed worker’s income in a recession
is Y¡ = b+ ±PY¡ +±(1 ¡ P) Y+: By these two equations (for Y¡ and for
entrants hired in an upturn were not …red in a downturn, long-run employment would not
be stationary.)
9We assume that …ring takes place in accordance with seniority. In equation (1), the
present value Yt+1 refers to a worker who becomes an insider in period t + 1. This junior
insider, whose present value of income is described in equation (3), becomes unemployed
if there is a recession in the following period, on account of …ring by seniority.
10Our analysis is concerned with the unemployment rate only in a boom. Thus, for
notational simplicity, we omit the superscript “+” from ut, taking it for granted that
ut = u
+
t .
6Y+), the present value of the unemployed worker’s expectedincome simpli…es
to
Y
¡ = Y
+ = b=(1 ¡ ±) (5)
By equations (1), (2), (3) and (5), we …nd that the reservation wage is
rt = r = b ¡
±P
1¡ ±P
(W
+ ¡ b) (6)
i.e. the reservation wage is equal to the unemployment bene…t minus the
expected future income di¤erential between an insider and an unemployed
worker.
The …rms make their employment decisions given this entrant (reserva-
tion) wage and the insider wage Wi, i = +;¡.
For simplicity, let all workers be equally productive,11 so that the produc-
tion function can be expressed as Q = Fi(N + n); i = +;¡. The production
function features positive and diminishing returns: Fi0 > 0, Fi00 < 0. We as-
sume, plausibly, that the marginal product of labor is greater in a boom than
in a recession (F+0 > F¡0).
We suppose that the parameter values of our model are that we can
exclude trivial and irrelevant cases. In particular, we assume that the boom-
recession di¤erential in marginal products (F+0 > F¡0) is su¢ciently large,
relative to the hiring and …ring cost, so that the …rm has an incentive to hire
in an upturn and …re in a downturn. We also assume that the insider wage
is su¢ciently low relative to the entrant wage (given the hiring and …ring
costs) so that the …rm has an incentive to retain its insiders.12
11Díaz-Vázquez and Snower (2002) analyse the consequences of relaxing this assumption
by allowing insiders to be more productive than entrants.
12The relevant restrictions on the parameters of the model are the following. In order
for the …rm to hire in an upturn (n+ > 0 in an upturn),
n+
t =
¡
F +0¢¡1
f(b + h) ¡ ±P [h ¡ ±(1¡ P )f]g¡ N +
t > 0
where (F +0)
¡1 is the inverse function, by the marginal condition for hiring in (12), and
N
+
t = N
¡
t¡1 (because in an upturn the …rm moves from recession into a boom), where
N ¡
t¡1 =
¡
F ¡0¢¡1
½
W ¡ ¡ ±(1 ¡ P)
￿
h ¡
1
1 ¡ ±P
(W + ¡ b) ¡ ±(1¡ P)f
¸
+ ±Pf ¡ f
¾
by the marginal condition for …ring in equation (14). Additionally, the …rm must not
have an incentive to …re insiders and put entrants in their place if the boom persists: the
expected marginal pro…tability of the insider in (11) must be greater than the …ring cost:
¦+0
t+1=h + w+ ¡ W + ¡ ±(1 ¡ P)f > ¡f
7Hiring entrants involves a hiring cost of h (a positive constant) per en-
trant. If entrants are retained for more than one period, they become “in-
siders,” who can be …red only if the …rm expends a …ring cost f (a positive
constant) per insider. By contrast, entrants can be …red costlessly. We as-
sume a limited seniority rule for …ring, whereby entrants hired in the current
boom are the …rst to be …red if the economy falls into recession.
The …rm’s problem is to maximize the present value of its pro…t. Conse-
quently, in an upturn its hiring decision problem is13
Max
n
+
t
F
+(n
+
t + N
+
t )¡ w
+n
+
t ¡ W
+N
+
t ¡ hn
+
t + ±E ¦t+1 (7)
where F+(n+
t +N+
t ) is revenue, w+n+
t +W+N+
t +hn+
t is its labor cost, and
±E ¦t+1 is expected future pro…t. In a downturn, its …ring decision problem
is
Max
N¡
t
F
¡(N
¡
t ) ¡ W
¡N
¡
t ¡ f
£
N
+
t¡1 ¡ N
¡
t
¤
+ ±E ¦t+1 (8)
To derive the e¤ect of insider wages on employment, we nowexamine the
hiring and …ring decisions and their implications.
3 The Hiring decision
The …rst-order condition for the hiring problem (7) is
F+0(n+
t +N+
t ) ¡ (w+ + h) +±P ¦+0
t+1 = 0 (9)
In words, in an upturn the …rm hires entrants until the present value of their
expected marginal pro…tability is zero. In the current period t, the entrant
generates pro…t F+0(n
+
t +N
+
t )¡(w++h). In the following period t+1, the
economy may either continue in the boom (with probability P) or fall into a
recession (with probability (1¡ P)). If there is a recession in period t + 1,
which equals (by equation 6):
h + f >
1
1 ¡ ±P
(W + ¡ b) + ±(1¡ P)f
Appendix B explains how these restrictions enable us to ignore the trivial and irrelevant
cases.
13For simplicity, we assume that the …rm is a perfect competitor in the product market,
so that revenue in real terms is equal to output. This assumption has no bearing on our
qualitative conclusions.
8the marginal entrant will be …red. Since the …rm incurs no …ring cost, the
expected marginal pro…t the marginal entrant generates is zero (and thus
does not appear in equation (9)).14 If boom continues into period t + 1,
the …rm retains all its workers and all the entrants become insiders, each
generating the present value of expected pro…t ¦
+0
t+1:
¦
+0
t+1 = F
+0(n
+
t + N
+
t ) ¡ W
+ +±P ¦
+0
t+2 +±(1¡ P) ¦
¡0
t+2 (10)
In period t + 1 the insider generates pro…t F +0(n
+
t + N
+
t ) ¡ W+. In the
following period t+2, with probability P the boom continues and the insider
generates pro…t ¦+0
t+2; and with probability 1 ¡ P the economy goes into
recession, the marginal insider is …red, and the …rm pays the …ring cost f,
so that ¦
¡0
t+2 = ¡f . In the stationary equilibrium, ¦
+0
t+1 = ¦
+0
t+2; and thus,
from (10) and (9), the insider’s pro…tability simpli…es to15
¦
+0
t+1=
£
h +w
+ ¡ W
+ ¡ ±(1 ¡ P)f
¤
(11)
Substituting this equation (11) and the reservation wage (6) into (9), the
marginal hiring condition becomes:
F+0(n+
t +N+
t ) ¡ (b+ h)+ ±P [h¡ ±(1¡ P)f] = 0 (12)
This hiring condition determines total boom-time employment n+
t +N+
t . Ob-
serve that the insider wage does not appear in this condition. Consequently,
boom-time employment is una¤ected by the insider wage. The reason is
that an increase in the insider wage leads to a one-for-one reduction in the
reservation wage, in present value terms.
4 The Firing decision
The …rst-order condition for the …ring problem (8) is
F¡0(N¡
t ) ¡ W¡ +±P ¦¡0
t+1 + ±(1¡ P) ¦+0
t+1 = ¡f (13)
(In a recession, the marginal insider generates a pro…t of F ¡0(N¡
t ) ¡ W¡ in
the current periodt. Inthe following period, there is a probability P that the
recession will continue and thus the marginal pro…t will be ¦
¡0
t+1, and there
14This follows from the seniority rule, whereby entrants are …red before insiders.
15Note that the marginal insider’s pro…tability di¤ers from that of the entrant on three
counts: (a) hiring an entrant involves a hiring cost h, (b) the insider’s wage di¤ers from
that of the entrant ( w+¡ W +), and (c) if the entrant is …red, the …rm pays no …ring cost,
but it pays a …ring cost f if …res the insider (¡±(1¡ P)f).
9is a probability (1 ¡ P) of a boom and the marginal pro…t will be ¦
+0
t+1.)
The marginal …ring condition indicates that the …rm continues …ring until
the present value of the marginal insider’s expected pro…tability is equal to
the …ring cost f.16
Note that if the …rm remains in a recession in period t + 1, then the
marginal insider’s expected pro…tability will continue to be equal to the …r-
ing cost (¦¡0
t+1 = ¡f). Substituting this equation, the marginal insider’s
pro…tability (11), and the reservation wage (6) into the …ring condition (13),
we obtain:
F¡0(N¡
t )¡ W¡ + ±(1 ¡ P)
￿
h ¡
1
1¡ ±P
(W+ ¡ b) ¡ ±(1 ¡ P)f
¸
¡ ±Pf = ¡f
(14)
This …ring condition determines total recession-time employment N¡
t ,
and, in contrast with the hiring condition, it does depend on the insider
wage. Here we can see that an increase in insider bargaining power, which
raises the insider wage in a recession and a boom, has the following e¤ects:
(a) In the current recession, the rise in the insider wage W¡ reduces
current (recession-time) employment N¡
t .17
(b) A rise in the insider wage W+ in a future boom, reduces current
(recession-time) employment N
¡
t . Additionally, the rise in the insider wage
W+ drives down the entrant wage in a future boom (since a higher in-
sider wage implies a lower reservation wage). (In equation (14), note that
1
1¡±P(W+ ¡ b) = W+ ¡ w+, which is the insider-entrant wage di¤erential.
Thus the term 1
1¡±P (W+ ¡ b) incorporates not only the rise in the insider
wage, but also the fall in the entrant (reservation) wage.) The reduction in
the entrant wage leads to a fall in recession-time employment N¡
t .18 The
reason is straightforward.19 If entrants become more pro…table relative to
insiders in a future boom, the …rms have less of an incentive to retain insid-
ers in a current recession. In other words, …rms …nd it more pro…table to …re
insiders, the cheaper it is to hire entrants.20
16In the stationary equilibrium, all entrants are …red and the marginal worker is an
insider.
17In the …ring condition (14), a rise in W ¡ must be matched by an increase in F ¡0(N
¡
t ),
so that employment N
¡
t must fall.
18By contrast, the entrant wage reduction has no in‡uence on employment in a boom,
since this reduction is exactly o¤set by the rise in the insider wage, so that the present
value of wage income is unchanged.
19Once again, in the …ring condition (14), a rise in W + ¡ w+ must be matched by an
increase in F ¡0(N
¡
t ), so that employment N
¡
t must fall.
20Observe that these e¤ects are not operative in booms. In boom the marginal worker is
105 Conclusion
The upshot of our analysis may be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 In the above model of recessions and booms, insider bar-
gaining power is harmful to employment, i.e. an increase in insider wages
reduces average employment (over recessions and booms). This result holds
even when entrants receive their reservation wages. In particular, an increase
in the insider wages promotes …ring in a recession, while leaving hiring in a
boom unchanged.
As we have seen, hiring in a boom is unchanged, because the rise in the
insider wage is equal to the fall in the entrant wage (in present value terms).
Thus the contractionary employment e¤ect of the insider-wage increase is
exactly o¤set by the expansionary employment e¤ect of the entrant-wage
decrease.
But for the …ring decision in a recession, these e¤ects do not o¤set one
another. On the contrary, they both pull in the same direction: both the rise
in the insider wage and the fall in the entrant wage give …rms an incentive
to …re more insiders in a recession.
On this account, a rise in insider wages drives down average employment.
Thereby our paper calls into question an in‡uential strand of the liter-
ature according to which a rise in insider wages reduces entrant wages, but
leaves employment una¤ected. According to the conventional reasoning, the
wages of infra-marginal workers make no di¤erence to employment; only the
wages of the marginal workers matter. The marginal workers are commonly
identi…ed as the entrants. After all, every insider must have started out as
an entrant, and if entrants are paid the reservation wage, then any change
in the insider wage leaves the …rm’s present value of wage payments over the
worker’s job tenure una¤ected and consequently the …rm has no incentive to
change employment.
Our analysis challenges this conventional wisdom by showing that, in the
presence of cyclical ‡uctuations, the insiders are not necessarily the infra-
marginal workers. To be precise, they are infra-marginal in upturns, when
entrants are hired, but they are marginal in downturns, when insiders are
…red. It is on this account that a rise in insider wages has no e¤ect on hiring,
but promotes …ring.
an entrant, who receives the reservation wage. Since an increase in the insider wage is met
by an equal drop in the reservation wage (in present value terms), boom-time employment
is not a¤ected.
11In the absence of cyclical downturns of su¢cient magnitude to induce
…ring, the conventional wisdom is correct. But when …ring occurs, higher
insider wages lead to lower average employment.
A Appendix A
The central conclusion of our analysis - that a rise in insider wages leads to
a fall in employment when entrants receive the reservation wage - does not
depend on the Markov structure of productivity swings. Suppose, on the
contrary, that the distribution of productivity movements is independent of
the current productivity state. In particular, suppose that with probability
P productivity is Z+ (a boom), and with probability (1¡P) productivity is
Z¡ (a recession), where Z+ > Z¡.
The expression for the reservation wage in equation (6) and the hiring
condition in equation (7) remain unchanged. The …ring condition under the
stable probability distribution now becomes
F¡0(N¡
t )¡ W¡ + ±P
￿
h¡
1
1¡ ±P
(W+ ¡ b)¡ ±(1¡ P)f
¸
¡ ±(1 ¡ P)f = ¡f
This equationshowsthatanincrease ininsider bargainingpower, whichraises
the insider wage in a recession and a boom, has the two e¤ects described in
section 4.
B Appendix B
If the restrictions on the parameters of our model (speci…ed in footnote 12)
are not satis…ed, we generate trivial or irrelevant cases, along the following
lines.
(1) Suppose that the insider wage is so high (relative to hiring and …ring
costs) that, in a boom, the …rm has an incentive to …re the entrants before
they become insiders. Then the …rm will have no incentive to retain its
entrants in a recession (since the marginal product is less in a recession than
in a boom). Consequently, the …rm will have no insiders, and thus it is
irrelevant to examine the employment implications of an increase in insider
power.
(2) Suppose that the parameter values are such that the …rm hires new
entrants when economic conditions improve, retains the workers if economic
conditions do not change but does not …re insiders in a recession. Then an
12increase in insider wages has no e¤ect on employment for a trivial reason:
since insiders are never …red (by assumption), an increase in insider wages
cannot lead to a fall in employment.
(3) Suppose thatthe parameter values are suchthat the…rm has noincen-
tive to hire new entrants in a boom. In the absence of entrants, employment
is zero and the …rm ceases operation.
(4) The …rm has an incentive to hire entrants in a boom and to …re all
its insiders in a recession. Then an increase in insider wages has no e¤ect on
employment for the trivial reason that, regardless of insider wages, recession-
time employment is always zero.
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